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Security is the discipline concerned with protecting systems from a wide range of 
threats (malice, error or mischief) that break the system by exploiting a vulnerability, 
i.e. a property of the system or its environment that, when faced with particular 
threats, can lead to failure[5] . Security is a multi-faceted problem; it is as much about 
understanding the domain in which systems operate as it is about the systems 
themselves. While developing security facilities such as encryption, identity control,  
or specific architectures is important, our attention should be drawn at looking into 
the sociotechnical context in which target systems will operate and threats that may 
arise and their potential harm, so as to uncover security requirements. Recent research 
has argued about the importance of considering security at the early stages of the 
information systems development process, and especially the need to consider 
security during RE.   
  An ontology, in the field of knowledge representation, is most often defined as “a 
representation of a conceptualization”[1]. It should  represent a shared 
conceptualization in order to have any useful purpose [2]. Ontologies are useful for 
representing and interrelating many types of knowledge. Several security ontologies 
have been proposed [3]. Domain ontologies are formal descriptions of classes of 
concepts and relationships between these concepts that describe a given domain. 
   Our previous experience with RITA [4] a requirements elicitation method that 
exploits a just one threat ontology, was that “being generic, the threats in the RITA 
ontology are not specific to the target [bank] industry” (the case study was in the 
banking sector). Experts involved in the evaluation complained about “the lack of 
specificity of the types of threats to the industry sector and the problem domain at 
hand”. The problem that remains open is therefore that we need to exploit both 
security knowledge and domain knowledge to guide the elicitation of domain-specific 
security requirements. Our research question is "how to combine the use of security 
ontologies and domain ontologies to guide requirements elicitation efficiently?"  
This paper presents an ongoing research project that aims to develop a method that 
explores the use of security and domain ontologies for SRE. The approach is generic 
in the sense that different security ontologies and different domain ontologies can be 
used with it. However it is domain specific when it is applied in the sense that during 
its application only one domain ontology is used.  
                                                          
 
Our method guides the discovery of security requirements for a specific domain. This 
process handled by a series of heuristic production rules that, starting from high level 
security requirements, produce a security requirements specification. Figure 1 shows 
an overview of our method. There are two sub-sets of rules. The first set of rules 
handles domain-specific analysis. The second set of rules performs a security specific 
analysis. Each set of rules exploits different ontologies: respectively domain 
ontologies and security ontologies. In order to be able to handle different security and 
domain ontologies, the rules were specified with so-called “upper ontologies”, that 
handle concepts that are (a) common to most ontologies, (b) sufficiently high level to 
abstract many other concepts in the specific ontologies, and (c) more importantly that 
represent an important subject of interest for the method. 
   The requirements definition process starts with the elicitation step, where 
stakeholders express their needs about security in non-formal sentences. Then an 
analysis stage is carried out to discover more requirements and express these needs in 
a semi-formal requirement. 
During the elicitation step, an initial I* requirements model is first constructed from 
the stakeholders' needs and concerns expressed about security at the beginning of the 
project. At this stage, the analyst defines initial actors, resources, and especially 
security goals (integrity, confidentiality, traceability...) During the security 
requirements analysis stage, the production rules will exploit the security-specific 
ontology to discover threats, vulnerabilities, countermeasures, and resources, and thus 
enrich the requirements model by adding new elements (malicious tasks, vulnerability 
points...). During the domain specific security requirements analysis stage, another set 
of rules explores the domain ontology to improve the requirements model with 
resources, actors and other concepts that are more specific to the domain at hand; for 
instance: thieves in the banking domain, hijackers in the aeronautic domain, pirates in 
the maritime domain, etc. 
The originality of the method lies: (a) in the fact that the combination of security 
and domain ontologies is not achieved a priori, but at runtime, while the method is 
applied, and (b) in the genericity of the method, in the sense that it is designed to be 
used with any pair of security and domain ontologies, as long as they embed some 
expected knowledge. 
Our preliminary evaluation conducted through a small, but real, case study and 
through critical analysis by three experts (domain, security, requirements engineering, 
respectively). The evaluation shows that the method provides a good balance between 
the genericity with respect to the ontologies (which do not need to be selected in 
advance), and the specificity of the elicited requirements with respect to the domain at 
hand.   
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